The main contribution of this paper is a (strong) completeness result for an axiomatization of Hansson [13]'s deontic system DSDL2, whose semantics involves a non-necessarily transitive betterness relation. Reference is made to a deductive system put forth by Åqvist [2, 3] .
Introduction
This paper is concerned with so-called preferential semantics for deontic logic. These rely on a binary relation, which ranks all possible worlds in terms of comparative goodness or betterness. Structures of this sort seem to have made their first explicit appearance in print with the paper of Hansson [13] . There they are used to give a semantical analysis of contrary-to-duty (or secondary) obligations, which tell us what comes into force when some other (primary) obligations are violated. A number of researchers have followed Hansson's suggestion, providing a more comprehensive investigation of the treatment of contrary-toduty obligations within a preference-based approach. It is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate such a treatment. The interested reader should consult the relevant literature (see, e.g., [3, 6, 9, 16, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28] ).
In what follows, I shall focus on the problem of how to axiomatize the classes of structures outlined by Hansson in the aforementioned pioneering paper. 1 Previous work has almost exclusively dealt with Hansson's 'official' system DSDL3, which makes relatively strong assumptions about the agent's rationality. A weakly complete axiomatization of DSDL3 can be found in Spohn [24] and Åqvist [2, 3] . This weak completeness result has been strengthened into a strong one in Parent [21] . Here my attention will be devoted to Hansson's weaker system DSDL2. It is much like DSDL3, except that the betterness relation is no longer required to be transitive. The requirement of transitivity has been criticized by a number of moral philosophers and contemporary decision theorists. 2 The question naturally comes into mind if DSDL2 can be axiomatized. Åqvist [2, 3] conjectured an axiomatic basis using an optimality operator language for dyadic deontic logic, whose symbol is ''Q'' ('optimally', 'ideally', ...). 3 Unfortunately this conjecture has been settled in the negative by Ardeshir and Nabavi in a recent article in this journal [4] . There it is argued that the proposed axiomatic basis is incomplete, i.e. that there is a formula that is not a theorem of the system even though it is valid in the corresponding class of models. Indeed, the following is such a sentence − this is simply Sen's property γ (see [23] ) in modal logical notation:
The main purpose of this paper is to show that completeness can be regained if (γ) is added to Åqvist's axiom set. The completeness result is a strong completeness theorem for the system. Moreover, the arguments in the proof carry over to the case where no specific restrictions are put on the betterness relation. Readers should be warned that there is far less standardization in preference semantics than in the usual Kripke-style semantics for deontic logic, and more room for variation. This is due to the fact that there are several factors that must be juggled all at once. In this paper I will stick to the Åqvist account. Those who wish to get a general overview of the possible approaches that can be taken might find it useful to consult Makinson [17] and Goble [11, 12] .
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the syntax, semantics and proof theory of the framework being used. Section 3 establishes completeness using canonical models. Section 4 lists a number of open questions that our main result raises.
Syntax, Semantics and Proof Theory
The syntax is generated by adding the following three unary modal operators to the syntax of propositional logic: 2 (for necessity); 3 (for possibility) ; and Q (for optimality). For QA read: ''ideally A'' or ''A under the best circumstances''. The set of well-formed formulae (wffs) is defined in the straightforward way. There are no restrictions as to iterations of deontic operators and modal ones.
The system comes with a possible worlds semanticsà la Kripke. I begin with the idea of an H-model ('H' is mnemonic for Hansson) , by which I understand a structure
in which (i) W =∅ (W is a set of 'possible worlds') (ii) ⊆ W ×W (Intuitively, is a betterness or comparative goodness relation; 'x y' can be read as 'world x is at least as good as world y'.) (iii) v : Prop → P(W ) (v is an assignment, which associates a set of possible worlds to each propositional letter p).
The definition of truth at a point in a model is as usual except for the modal clauses. I use the following evaluation rules, where x and y are in W :
operator '' '' (ceteris paribus) due to Åqvist (see [1] ), and further discussed by Lewis in section 2.8 of [15] , and Humberstone (see [14] ) among others. The comparative goodness relation may be constrained by suitable conditions as desired. I shall focus on the class of (Åqvist's terminology) H 2 -models, whose betterness relation fulfills the following two requirements:
• reflexivity:
where
the set of worlds in which A holds
The class of H 2 -models corresponds to Hansson's system DSDL2. Semantic consequence, validity and satisfiability are defined as usual relative to the latter class. Some readers familiar with Hansson's paper [13] might wonder why (in the introductory remarks) DSDL2 is described as corresponding to the non-necessarily transitive case. Two other systems are discussed by Hansson. One is DSDL1, whose betterness relation is only reflexive. The other is DSDL3, which is obtained from DSDL2 by requiring the betterness relation also be transitive and total (''for all x,y ∈ W , either x y or y x''). In fact, there is some redundancy in adding the latter requirement. For, in the finite case (i.e. when the language is generated from finitely many propositional letters), (δ 2 ) entails the total order assumption. 4 It therefore makes sense to say that DSDL2 is distinguished from DSDL3 by just letting the transitivity condition go. Note, however, that the question of whether (δ 2 ) also entails the total order assumption in the infinite case remains an open problem.
I now briefly turn to the proof theory. The axioms are the tautologies, the S5-schemata for 2 and 3, and the sentences
The rules are modus ponens and the rule of necessitation for 2. ('Ch' is mnemonic for Chernoff [8] , and the abbreviation 'CD' is taken from Chellas [7] .) The axiomatic system comprising all instances of these axiom schemata and rules will be called simply . Theoremhood, deducibility, and consistency are defined as usual relative to the latter system.
Ardeshir and Nabavi [4] showed that (γ) cannot be proved from the remaining axioms of . Soundness of with respect to the class of H 2 -models is easy to demonstrate, and may be left to the reader. Completeness is shown in the next section using the canonical model method. Definitions and facts relative to maximal consistent sets (mcs's, for short) will be taken for granted (see, e.g., Chellas [7] ).
Completeness Result
I begin by stating formally the principle result that is to be established here.
is (strongly) complete with respect to the class of H 2 -models.
PROOF. The key idea is to work with a point-generated canonical model. Let W be the set of all mcs's of . Let w be a fixed element of W . Define the canonical model M w = (W , ,v) generated by w as follows:
is the binary relation on W defined by x y if either x = y or {A : QA ∈ x}∩y =∅ (iii) v is the valuation function defined by v(p) ={x ∈ W : p ∈ x} for all p in Prop.
Obviously as so defined is reflexive. Before establishing that also fulfills the limit assumption (δ 2 ), it might help to extend the 'truth = membership' equation to arbitrary formulae. For the left-to-right direction, we argue contrapositively. We assume that QB ∈ x, and prove that x |= QB. If x |= B, we are done. So assume x |= B. By the inductive hypothesis, B ∈ x. There are two possibilities:
Note that {A : 2A ∈ w} =∅ since ∈ {A : 2A ∈ w} because 2 ∈w by necessitation. Now suppose, to reach a contradiction, that 5 Here I am referring to Åqvist's system S 5 
..∧2A m ∈ w, and so 2¬QB ∈ w, i.e., ¬3QB ∈ w. So by (CD) ¬3B ∈ w, i.e., 2¬B ∈ w. But then by construction ¬B ∈ x, contrary to the consistency of x. Therefore y − must be consistent. By Lindenbaum's lemma, y − has a maximal consistent extension, call it y. Obviously y ∈ W and B ∈ y by the (T) schema. The inductive hypothesis gives y |= B. From supposition {A : QA ∈ x}=∅, and so a fortiori {A : QA ∈ x}∩y =∅. Furthermore, x = y because QB ∈ y and QB ∈ x. So x y, which suffices for x |= QB.
Case 2: ∃A s.t. QA ∈ x. The set z − ={A : 2A ∈ w}∪{¬A : QA ∈ x}∪{B} is consistent. For suppose otherwise. Then for m,n ≥ 1 there are sentences A 1 , ..., A m in {A : 2A ∈ w} and sentences ¬B 1 , ..., ¬B n in {¬A : QA ∈ x} such that
Hence by the properties of 2 again,
In particular, QB 1 ,QB 2 ∈ x; hence QB 1 ∧QB 2 ∈ x. A first application of (γ) yields Q(B 1 ∨B 2 ) ∈ x, so that Q(B 1 ∨B 2 )∧QB 3 ∈ x. A second application of (γ), then, yields Q(B 1 ∨B 2 ∨B 3 ) ∈ x. The number of B i 's is finite. 6 Reiterating this argument n times we arrive at the result that Q(B 1 ∨...∨B n ) ∈ x. But B ∈ x; hence Q(B 1 ∨...∨ B n )∧B ∈ x. Using (Ch) we may further move B inside the scope of Q obtaining the contradiction that Q((B 1 ∨...∨B n )∧B) ∈ x. Therefore z − is consistent, and has a maximal consistent extension, z. It is clear that z ∈ W and B ∈ z, and thus the inductive hypothesis yields z |= B.
Choose any A such that QA ∈ x − we can make such a choice since we are assuming that x contains at least one sentence of this form. By construction ¬A ∈ z, and thus A ∈ z by consistency of z. This shows that {A : QA ∈ x}∩z =∅. This also shows that x = z since A ∈ x by the (T) schema. So x z, and thus x |= QB as required. This establishes Lemma 3.2.
It remains to verify that fulfills the limit assumption (δ 2 ). A similar argument as before − it rests essentially on (CD) − yields that y − is consistent, and has a maximal consistent extension, y. Obviously, y ∈ W , and A ∈ y given the (T) schema. Using Lemma 3.2, it follows that y |= A. Let z be such that z |= A. By Lemma 3.2, A ∈ z, and so by definition of , y z since QA ∈ y. This shows that (δ 2 ) is met.
Theorem 3.1, the principle result of this paper, now follows in the usual way. The argument is standard. Details are omitted.
Let us now briefly consider the system obtained by just removing (CD) from our . As can easily be verified, is sound with respect to the class of all H-models, and the class of H-models in which the betterness relation is reflexive (DSDL1). For completeness with respect to the first class of models, we can adapt the argument for Theorem 3.1 as follows.
• W is the set of all mcs's of containing every wff A for which 2A is in w;
• P is defined thus: xPy if and only if {A : QA ∈ x}∩y =∅;
• v is as usual.
To verify that Lemma 3.2 holds for , we need only run through the proof of the modal part of the inductive step again, making one small variation. Note, first, that in the verification of the left-to-right direction, there is no more need to show that x = y and x = z. Then, when handling case 1 above, put y − ={A : 2A ∈ w}∪{B}. The consistency of y − follows at once from y − ⊆ x (and the consistency of x). It is notable that the proposed method, which works so smoothly for DSDL2 and the class of all H-models, cannot be extended to DSDL1. Let us see why not. First, there is no guarantee that P as just defined is reflexive. The simplest way around is to work with the reflexive closure of P, as we did in the proof of Theorem 3.1. But, then, when rerunning the proof of Lemma 3.2, we get stuck on case 1, because there is no way to ensure that x = y ⊇{A : 2A ∈ w}∪{B}. To rule out case 1 from the outset, it suffices to work with a submodel of the original canonical model, obtained by just removing from W all the mcs's that do not contain any formula of the form QA. 7 But, then, the argument for case 2 does not go through, because there is in general no guarantee that the mcs z contains one wff of this form. In other words, there is no guarantee that z is part of the submodel we are working with. Thus here is an unexpected difficulty.
Open Questions
• Can an analogous completeness result be established for DSDL1?
• Does the system DSDL2 have the finite model property?
• Can a similar completeness result be proven for Åqvist's system F for conditional obligation (see [3, p. 248] ), or one close to it?
